Many species of bacteria collectively sense and respond to their social and physical environment via 'quorum sensing' (QS), a communication system controlling extracellular cooperative traits. Despite detailed understanding of the mechanisms of signal production and response, there remains considerable debate over the functional role(s) of QS: in short, what is it for? Experimental studies have found support for diverse functional roles: density sensing, mass-transfer sensing, genotype sensing, etc. While consistent with theory, these results cannot separate whether these functions were drivers of QS adaption, or simply artifacts or 'spandrels' of systems shaped by distinct ecological pressures. The challenge of separating spandrels from drivers of adaptation is particularly hard to address using extant bacterial species with poorly understood current ecologies (let alone their ecological histories). To understand the relationship between environmental challenges and trajectories of QS evolution, we used an agent-based simulation modeling approach. Given genetic mixing, our simulations produce behaviors that recapitulate features of diverse microbial QS systems, including coercive (high signal / low response) and generalized reciprocity (signal auto-regulation) strategists -that separately and in combination contribute to QS-dependent resilience of QS-controlled cooperation in the face of diverse cheats. We contrast our in silico results with bacterial QS architectures that have evolved under largely unknown ecological contexts, highlighting the critical role of genetic constraints in shaping the shorter term (experimental evolution) dynamics of QS. More broadly, we see experimental evolution of digital organisms as a complementary tool in the search to understand the emergence of complex QS architectures and functions.
Introduction across multiple bacterial systems [17, 19, 20, 24, 30, 32, [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] . Across these experimental 53 systems, there is evidence that QS systems can limit cooperative investments to high 54 density [19] , low mass transfer [21, 44] and clonal [30, 32] environments -in some cases 55 these responses have demonstrated fitness advantages [19, 30, 32] . While consistent with 56 theoretical predictions, these results cannot separate whether these functional roles were 57 the drivers of QS evolution, or simply fortuitous byproducts or 'spandrels' [45] of a 58 complex system driven by other ecological pressures. 59 The challenge of separating drivers of adaptation from 'spandrel' properties is 60 particularly hard to address using extant bacterial species with complex QS 61 architectures that have evolved under ecological conditions that we scarcely understand. 62 To address this challenge we turn to in silico experimental evolution [46] , which allows 63 us to evolve signaling strategies among digital organisms under defined ecological 64 challenges. We study the joint evolution of multiple QS component traits (basal signal 65 production, cooperative response, signal auto-regulation) under a range of conditions of 66 environmental heterogeneity (variable densities and variable genetic mixing among 67 groups). 68 
Methods Summary

69
In our agent-based in silico evolution experiments, we first consider two evolving traits, 70 basal production rate (p) and signal response threshold (S T h ). In subsequent 71 simulations, we introduce an additional evolving trait, the auto-regulation ratio (r), the 72 ratio of fully induced to basal signal level. These co-evolving traits combine to govern 73 individual cell decisions to turn on or off cooperation in different environmental 74 conditions. Populations are subject to selection based on individual cooperation payoffs 75 (incorporating costs of cooperation and signaling, and environment-dependent benefits), 76 and evolve for a fixed number of generations as shown in Fig. 1 (see Appendix for more 77 model implementation details). The fitness of all individual founders is evaluated across a range of testing environments (different population densities). Then, individuals are selected proportionally to their payoffs for clonal reproduction but are subject to mutation in their quorum sensing traits (signal production, threshold to response, and in some simulations, auto-regulation). Finally, the offspring pool with the same size as the initial propagate pool was formed for the next generation.
The fitness of each genotype in each sub-population is assessed across a spectrum of 79 March 28, 2019 3/15 potential bacterial carrying capacities (see Fig. 1 ). For carrying capacity (at density N ), 80 signaling and resulting cooperative responses are described by an ODE governing 81 extracellular signal concentration. Specifically, we consider the following two scenarios 82 of signal dynamics for QS-controlled cooperation in absence (Eq. (1)) and presence 83 (Eq. (2)) of auto-regulation, respectively.
where S is the local signal concentration, t is time, N is the stationary phase cell 85 density, p is the basal signal production rate, r is the ratio of auto-regulation production 86 to basal signal production, K is the half concentration value, and u is the signal decay 87 rate. We assume that signal concentration rapidly equilibrates to S * (see Appendix ), 88 and use this value to determine individual cooperation. Individuals will turn on their 89 cooperative phenotype only when the local signal concentration is higher than the 90 individual response threshold (S * > S T h ). Both signaling and cooperation are costly to 91 individuals, but they benefit from cooperation only when the local cellular density is 92 above a certain threshold N T h . Therefore cost-effective cooperative behavior is 93 dependent on the effective tuning of QS to identify an underlying density threshold. For 94 constitutive cooperation (No QS), individuals will always turn on cooperation regardless 95 of local signaling environment -they do not have the ability to make social informed 96 choices. The Julia source code can be downloaded here: https://bit.ly/2u3OcSM 97
Results
98
The quorum sensing coordination game in a clonal context 99 We begin by defining a cooperative trait with a threshold density dependent benefit (see 100 Methods Summary and Appendix ), and illustrate that the joint evolution of signal Signal production rate and threshold response co-evolve in a quorum sensing co-ordination game. We evolved 5, 000 initially identical genotypes for 5, 000 generations in a patchy, variable density environment (see Fig. 1 ). In all simulations, the cost of cooperation was fixed and there was no auto-regulation. (A) We used a fixed cost of signaling, and recorded the percentage of evolved individuals who turned on cooperation in 100 testing environments where the cellular density varied from 10 1.5 to 10 5 cells per µL. Note constitutive individuals, by definition, will always turn on cooperation in all environments as shown by the gray dotted line. QS-controlled and constitutive cooperation ( Fig. 3A ). In the clonal limit (Ḡ → 1), we 129 see the efficiency benefit of matching cooperative behavior to environment compared to 130 constitutive cooperation, as illustrated in Fig. 2A . As the degree of genotypic mixing 131 increases, the overall payoff for constitutive cooperation is in addition fast diminishing 132 due to the evolution of increasingly lower levels of constitutive cooperation, tending to 133 zero. In contrast, cooperation is more robust to increased genetic mixing when 134 controlled by QS. Note that the average payoff of QS-controlled cooperation is below 135 the baseline, for high levels ofḠ. This is because of persistent costs of low levels of 136 signaling, maintained due to selection-drift balance.
137
To understand the greater robustness of QS controlled cooperation we examined the 138 joint evolution of the component signal and response traits under different conditions of 139 genetic mixing ( Fig. 3B , also see Appendix, Fig. S3A ). Consistent with earlier 140 theory [25] , we found that clonality selected for 'conspiratorial whisper' strategies, 141 coupling low signaling with low response thresholds. Conversely, under moderate 142 genetic mixing we found the evolution of 'coercive' strategies featuring high signal 143 production and high thresholds to response -capable of inducing greater cooperative 144 responses from their less coercive ancestors when sharing a local population. For low to 145 intermediate levels of genetic mixing (Ḡ = 1 to 3), we see that the evolved genotypes stay close to the functional constraint (pN /u > S T h ), which implies that they are able 147 to effectively identify the density threshold when working as a solitary clone (as in 148 Fig. 2A ). However, in the event of a mixed sub-population the genotype with the higher 149 signal and response threshold will act as a conditional cheat by inducing greater 150 cooperative investment from its partner. As genetic mixing is further increased, the 151 probability of ever experiencing a clonal environment is diminished (e.g. forḠ = 3, the 152 per sub-population probability of clonality is ∼ 0.17), and therefore selection on clonal 153 efficacy is relaxed. In these low relatedness contexts, we see evolutionary trajectories 154 towards simple cheating strategies, captured by high response thresholds and low / 155 drifting signal production ( Fig. 3B ).
156
To explore how genetic constraints affect QS-controlled cooperation, we also 157 investigated the overall cooperation payoff when one trait was genetically constrained to 158 be constant. When only evolving the response threshold (holding signal production 159 constant and non-zero), the overall cooperation payoff is rapidly lost whenḠ > 2 160 (Appendix, Fig. S4B ). These 'response-evolving' populations can perform effective QS 161 regulation in a clonal context (G = 1), but they are more prone to cheat takeover given 162 genetic mixing compared to the joint-evolving populations (Appendix, Fig. S4A ), as 163 they cannot evolve coercive strategies. In contrast, the 'signal-evolving' populations 164 (with genetically fixed response thresholds) illustrate an example of a genetic constraint 165 driving increased cooperative robustness (Appendix, Fig. S4B ). Recent theory and experimental work has suggested that auto-regulation (specifically, a 169 positive feedback loop between signal response and signal production [22, 47] ) helps to 170 maintain QS-controlled cooperation by increasing phenotypic assortment [32] . To auto-regulation ratio r (the ratio of maximally induced production to baseline signal 174 production (Eq. (2), see Methods Summary)). We first compared the overall 175 cooperation payoff of QS-controlled cooperation with auto-regulation against 176 QS-controlled cooperation without auto-regulation and constitutive cooperation. From 177 Fig. 4A , we see that auto-regulation QS enhances the evolutionary robustness of 178 cooperation in the face of medium to high levels of genetic mixing.
179
To begin to decipher the mechanisms of greater resilience of QS with auto-regulation, 180 we again examined the joint evolution of the three component traits, p, S T h and r 181 ( Fig. 4B , and also see Appendix, Fig. S3B ). In Appendix, Fig. S5 , we see that the 182 evolved auto-regulation ratio r is close to 1 in the clonal context (i.e. doubling of total 183 signal production under maximal auto-regulation, compared to baseline), suggesting 184 there is some benefit to auto-regulation in a clonal context. In contrast, under 185 conditions of genetic mixing auto-regulation evolves to higher levels, peaking at 8 for Table S1 .
Generalized reciprocity protects QS-controlled cooperation 199 from exploitation by cheats 200 To build a mechanistic understanding of why QS-controlled cooperation with 201 auto-regulation is more robust, we measured the phenotypic assortment between 202 individual and group cooperative investment. Fig. 5A shows that in the case of G = 2 203 (two genotypes per sub-population) and the absence of auto-induction, the relationship 204 between the cooperative behavior of an individual (x-axis) and of its group (y-axis) is 205 positive but with substantial variation. In contrast, the introduction of auto-induction 206 (Fig. 5B ) produces a much tighter relationship between individual and group levels of individuals and other members of the group (see [32] ).
211
To further diagnose how social selection is modified by auto-regulation we 212 partitioned selection within and between groups (Appendix, Figs. S9 and S10). For fixed costs of cooperation and signaling with the number of mixing genotypes G = 2, we collected 5, 000 same initial genotypes and evolved them for 5, 000 generations with no auto-regulation (A) and auto-regulation (B). We recorded the individual and group mean investment for cooperation at the last generation over 100 replications. Each blue dot represents an individual's investment against its group mean investment. The red lines are the regression lines fitted using the generalized linear model with a normal distribution. The analysis of covariance shows there is a significant difference between the slope of no auto-regulation in (A) and the slope of auto-regulation in (B) (F -test, p = 0.000). Similar results varying G can be found in Appendix, Fig. S8 . The remaining parameters used in the simulations can be found in Appendix, Table S1 .
Discussion
216
In this study we examined the evolutionary dynamics of quorum sensing traits in an in 217 silico system, to remove the complexities of experimental model systems that have 218 evolved under diverse and largely unknown ecological contexts. Stripping away the 219 system specific complexities of quorum-sensing highlights that QS is at base a 220 co-ordination game, where the reward for a particular signaling strategy depends on the 221 prevailing strategy of response and vice versa [48, 49] . Under the defined context of our 222 in silico environments, populations that exploit environments clonally can jointly tune 223 signal and response traits to effectively resolve and respond to variation in local optimization of plasmid number within cells), and interpreted this model in the context 241 of the evolutionary 'policing' literature [52, 53] , with the repressor / signal interpreted as 242 a 'policing' trait, and the target affinity / response trait interpreted as a critical and 243 joint-evolving 'obedience' trait. In both the plasmid and QS contexts, we see the 244 potential for similar co-evolutionary runaways towards increasing coercion (high signal, 245 low response equilibria) under conditions of increased genetic mixing ( Fig. 3 and also 246 see Fig. 4 in [54] ). However, as genetic mixing increases this coercive peak in signaling 247 (policing) fails due to a collapse in obedience / response (Fig. 3 ). The resulting hump in 248 signal investment with increased genetic mixing is predicted by a simple analytical game 249 theory model [25] and now has support from two distinct simulation models built with 250 very different biological motivations (this study and [51, 54] ), which raises the challenge 251 of why this result has been difficult to pin down experimentally, despite explicit 252 attention [55] . Later in the discussion we return to this point in a general overview of 253 the empirical context, but in short, it appears that the genetics of auto-regulation 254 present an effective mechanistic block to the elaboration of coercive strategies.
255
One of the key hallmarks of many (but not all) QS regulatory architectures is signal 256 auto-regulation, where signal response is coupled to increase the signal 257 production [40, [56] [57] [58] [59] , leading to increased synchrony across individual cellular 258 responses [47] . To explore the evolutionary role of auto-regulation in our system, we 259 added auto-regulation as a third evolving trait, and found that this additional 260 evolutionary dimension led to a further increase in the robustness of QS controlled 261 cooperation ( Fig. 4 ). In the evolved auto-regulation lineages we found a stronger degree 262 of phenotype matching (assortment) between individuals and their group (Fig. 5 ), 263 demonstrating that positive feedback control of signal production allows individuals to 264 tune their cooperative behavior to their social environment. This result is consistent 265 with a recent experimental paper on P. aeruginosa, which demonstrated that P. 266 aeruginosa can facultatively tune its per-capita cooperative investment to the 267 proportion of wildtype cooperators in its local group, in a manner that will promote the 268 maintenance of cooperation [32] . Allen et al. described this behavior as an example of 269 generalized reciprocity, highlighting that by encoding a simple rule of 'cooperate when 270 with cooperators' bacteria can increase the robustness of cooperation and the regulatory 271 architectures that control cooperation [32] .
272
In the simple environmental and genetic world of our in silico bacteria, populations 273 readily evolve complex strategies of coercion and generalized reciprocity. While 274 generalized reciprocity has been reported for P. aeruginosa, coercion has been far more 275 elusive, despite direct experimental evolution tests [55] . Popat et al. experimentally evolved P. aeruginosa under conditions of high and low genetic mixing, and found that 277 under conditions of intermediate and low genetic mixing, the level of signal production 278 only went down (alongside response); there was no peak in coercion [55] . One possible 279 account for this disconnect with our simulations is that on the ∼ 1 month timescale of 280 experimental evolution the evolutionary dynamics are constrained by the genetic 281 mechanisms of auto-regulation: The easiest solution to reduce signal response is to 282 mutate the signal receptor (in P. aeruginosa, this is frequently achieved by ∆lasR 283 mutations) which has the pleiotropic consequence of also largely abolishing signal 284 production. 285 This argument suggests that coercive strategies are more likely to be evolvable on 286 short timescales in bacteria without strong auto-regulatory constraints, such as V. 287 cholerae [60] (but see [61] ). In our main text results all traits could independently 288 evolve, and thus both generalized reciprocity (signal auto-regulation) and coercion (high 289 signal / low response) are accessible simultaneously. In Appendix, Fig. S4 , we 290 introduced simple genetic constraints (constraining the evolution of one trait and 291 allowing others to freely evolve) and found substantial shifts in evolutionary trajectories, 292 either helping (with a fixed response, see blue dots in Appendix, Fig. S4B ) or harming 293 (with a fixed signal, see yellow dots in Appendix, Fig. S4B ) the maintenance of 294 cooperation depending on genetic details.
295
The existence of a genetic constraint does not imply that over longer time-scales the 296 constraint is immutable. Take for example the constraint imposed by lasR co-regulation 297 on the trajectories of signal production and signal threshold in P. aeruginosa. Sandoz et 298 al. reported two lasR mutants (lasR5 and lasR8) that displayed near-wildtype levels of 299 signal production but with lower level of signal response [27] . In principle, it is possible 300 that signal production and response could evolve independently in P. aeruginosa by 301 separately targeting steps that are downstream of lasR, for instance targeting multiple 302 promoter sites to separately tune the impact of LasR on signal synthase and cooperative 303 effector genes. Gurney et al. [33] recently demonstrated using experimental evolution 304 that P. aeruginosa can rewire its response to multiple signal inputs in order to escape 305 ancestral genetic constraints on social behaviors -in this example, through the 306 evolution of novel cheating strategies to escape pleiotropic constraints termed 'metabolic 307 incentives to cooperate' [29] .
308
In our 'in silico' evolution, we know the ecological challenges that bacteria are facing 309 in the controlled environments. Specifically, we defined a density threshold for the 310 rewards of turning on cooperation and showed that bacteria can evolve strategies that 311 are adaptations to 'density sensing'. However, as a result we inevitably also evolve 312 spandrels (a byproduct of adaptive selection, see [62] ). For example, our evolved 313 bacteria can in principle perform a 'diffusion sensing' role to differentiate mass transfer 314 regimes [20] , despite never experiencing this challenge. On the other hand, it is possible 315 that if we set the environmental challenges to 'diffusion sensing', we will evolve 'density 316 sensing' as spandrels (or exaptation). The ability to precisely define and control the In the in silico evolution, we consider two evolving traits, basal production rate (p) and 3 signal response threshold (S T h ) for simulations in the absence of auto-regulation, 4 whereas we introduce an additional evolving trait, auto-regulation ratio (r) for 5 simulations including the auto-regulation mechanism. Each individual in the population 6 pool has a single genotype which consists of those two or three evolving traits. The 7 individuals can make their own decisions to turn on or off cooperation as a function of 8 signal mediated interactions, which in turn depend on the physical and social 9 environment. Specifically, the evolution process is described in Main Text, Fig. 1:   10 1) Total N pop genotypes with same initial conditions (same p init , S T hinit and r init ) 11 were generated to from a population pool. 12 2) A certain number of genotypes (G, drawn from zero-truncated Poisson 13 distribution, unless otherwise specified) were randomly selected (with 14 replacement) from the population pool and form a mixed sub-population. 15 3) For each of N env sub-population testing environments, the signal concentration in 16 the mixed sub-population can be calculated as S * using Eq. (S2) (or Eq. (S7) for 17 auto-regulation case). 18 4) Each genotype in the mixed sub-population was evaluated for its overall 19 cooperation payoff separately across all sub-population testing environments 20 (where the cellular density was varied) using Eq. (S3) (or Eq. (S8) in 21 auto-regulation case): Each individual paid for its own cost for signaling and the 22 cost of cooperation, if any, but only gained a benefit when the number of 23 cooperators in sub-population were greater than a certain threshold, N T h . 24 5) Repeat 2) to 4) until the same size of population pool was formed. 25 6) All individuals were selected (with replacement) from the population pool to 26 reproduce with a probability proportional to their overall cooperation payoff. 27 
7)
All evolving traits (p, S T h and r) of the offspring were subject to mutation at 28 rates λ p , λ S T h and λ r with standard deviations SD p , SD S T h or SD r for different 29 traits. Specifically, for each evolving trait, the actual number of individuals 30 selected for mutation was drawn from a Poisson distribution with the mean being 31 λ p , λ S T h and λ r , respectively. The mutation operation was done by adding a 32 value of N (0, SD) to the original trait value, where N (0, SD) is the normal 33 distribution with a mean 0 and a standard deviation SD to be SD p , SD S T h or 34 SD r for different traits. 35 8) Repeat 2) to 7) until Gen max generations were reached. 36 Model assumptions 37 For the computational models presented in the paper, we assume that: 38 1) A single signal type exists. 39 2) The environment in each sub-population forms a closed, i.e., no mass transfer. 40 3) For a given sub-population testing environment, an individual can be rewarded 41 with a benefit for cooperation only if the number of cooperators is greater than 42 the defined threshold (N T h ). 43 March 28, 2019 1/17 4) All offspring cloned from a certain parental genotype behave similarly, i.e., no 44 heterogeneity. 45 5) The signal concentration in each sub-population rapidly reaches equilibrium 46 estimated by Eq. (S1) or Eq. (S6), depending on whether invoking the 47 auto-regulation mechanism. 48 Computational model of quorum sensing without 49 auto-regulation 50 The computational model of signal dynamics for quorum sensing without 51 auto-regulation is given as below:
where S is the local signal concentration, t is time, N is the local cell density, p is the 53 basal signal production rate, and u is the signal decay rate. The equilibrium of Eq. (S1) 54 is given by:
In the absence of the auto-regulation mechanism, the individual genotype's overall 56 cooperation payoff across all sub-population testing environments is assessed as follows: 57
where i (i = 1, 2, · · · , N pop ) represents an individual genotype, j (j = 1, 2, · · · , N env ) 58 represents the index number of a sub-population testing environment, B 0 is the baseline 59 payoff, B coop , C coop , C sig are constants for the benefit of cooperation, cost of 60 cooperation and cost of signaling, respectively, p i is the basal signal production rate of 61 the genotype i. The function of cooperation cost of the individual i in the 62 sub-population testing environment j is defined as:
where G is the number of mixing genotypes in a sub-population, N j is the local cellular 64 density in the j th sub-population testing environment, and p g and S T hg are the signal 65 production rate and signal response threshold of the genotype g (g = 1, 2, · · · , G) in the 66 sub-population, respectively. Similarly, the function of cooperative benefit of the 67 individual i in the sub-population testing environment j is defined as:
where N T h is the cellular density threshold (defined as the median cellular density 69 across all testing environments).
70
Computational model of quorum sensing with auto-regulation 71
The computational model of signal dynamics for quorum sensing with auto-regulation is 72 given as below:
where S is the local signal concentration, t is time, N is the local cell density, p is the 74 basal signal production rate, r is the ratio of auto-regulation production to basal signal 75 production, K is the half concentration value, and u is the signal decay rate. The 76 equilibrium of Eq. (S6) is given by:
Note that previous studies have indicated the choice of Hill function exponent to be 78 2 [1, 2] . However, for the purpose of computational convenience, we used 1 as the Hill 79 function exponent, which can lead to a close form solution, Eq. (S7). When invoking the 80 auto-regulation mechanism, the individual genotype's overall cooperation payoff across 81 all testing environments is assessed as follows:
where i (i = 1, 2, · · · , N pop ) represents an individual genotype, j (j = 1, 2, · · · , N env ) 83 represents the index number of a sub-population testing environment, B 0 is the baseline 84 payoff, B coop , C coop , C sig are constants for the benefit of cooperation, cost of 85 cooperation and cost of signaling, respectively, p i and r i are the basal signal production 86 rate and auto-regulation ratio of the genotype i, respectively, and S * i = jS * ij N env 87 whereS * ij is defined in Eq. (S9). The function of cooperation cost of the individual i in 88 the sub-population testing environment j is defined as:
where G is the number of mixing genotypes in a sub-population, S * gj (calculated by 90 Eq. (S7)) and S T hg are the equilibrium signal concentration and signal response 91 threshold of the genotype g (g = 1, 2, · · · , G) in the sub-population, respectively. The 92 function of cooperative benefit of the individual i in the sub-population testing 93 environment j, and H Bij is defined as the same as in Eq. (S5).
94
Adding noise to signal 95 To investigate how clonal populations cope with signal noise to sustain cooperation, we 96 added noise to the equilibrium signal. In the simulations, the noise signal is drawn from 97 a normal distribution with mean S * and standard deviation κ · S * , i.e., N (S * , κ · S * ), the actual number of mixing genotypes in each sub-population in every generation was 106 drawn from a zero-truncated Poisson distribution with the average being
where (λ G ∈ [0, 10]; step size: 0.1). We define the clonal case 108 (G = 1) when λ G = 0 where exact one genotype will be selected to form the 109 sub-population, i.e., no genetic mixing. Note that the number of sub-populations may 110 be different in every generation due to the variation of mixing genotypes in each 111 subpopulation.
112
Constructing constitutive cooperators 113 To investigate how decision making interact with social behaviors of cooperation, we 114 compared the overall payoff of cooperation of individuals mediated by QS with those in 115 the absence of collective control. Specifically, we constructed constitutive cooperators 116 which do not have the ability to make social informed choices. In the clonal case, 117 wild-type individuals will always cooperate. This will incur a penalty to each of such 118 individuals for cooperating in wrong environments 1 . In the genetic mixing scenarios, the 119 cooperative benefits of wild-type individuals will be shared evenly with all group 120 members. In the simulations, all individuals were subject to mutation, switching from a 121 wild-type to mutant, or mutant to wild-type depending on their own initial type. The 122 actual number of replacement individuals was drawn from a Poisson distribution with 123 the mean being 0.01. Note that mutant individuals will always reap the benefits of 124 cooperation without paying for any cost. Formally, the overall cooperation payoff in the 125 constitutive cooperation scenarios can be defined as:
where P W T is the proportion of wild-type individuals in the sub-population with a 127 group size G. To test if the auto-regulation mechanism could be explained by the generalized 140 reciprocity theory, we recoded the mean value of cooperative investment 3 within each 141 1 Note that half of total testing environments are regarded as 'wrong' environments since we set N T h as the median cellular density across all testing environments. 2 Here, we only consider non-cheats. In other words, the existing cheats in the population pool will not be chosen. 3 The individual genotype's cooperative investment is simply defined as the number of sub-population testing environments where cooperation is turned on. sub-population in the genetic mixing scenario where individuals are grouped into small 142 collectives. We then plotted the group mean cooperative investment against individual 143 cooperative investment. Finally, the regression line was fitted using the generalized 144 linear model with a normal distribution. The slope of the regression line indicates the 145 phenotypic assortment of cooperative investment. When the slope is high, the behaviors 146 among individuals shifts closer to each other, investing more in cooperation. Otherwise, 147 the behaviors of investment for cooperation vary among individuals.
148
Partitioning selection on cooperative investment 149 To further uncover the influence of the auto-regulation mechanism on cooperative 150 behaviors in our evolution simulations, we employed the powerful conceptual framework 151 of the Price equation to partition the selection on cooperative investment into both 152 individual (within sub-populations) and group (between sub-populations) level [3] . The 153 Price equation describes the change in the average amount of a trait (z) from one 154 generation to the next (∆z) as a function of the covariance of between the fitness and 155 the trait value among individuals (Cov(w i , z i )), and the expected change in the amount 156 of the trait value (E(w i ∆z i )) due to transmission error such as genetic drift, mutation 157 bias, etc. The general form of the Price equation is given as below:
where z represents the trait cooperative investment, w i is the number of offspring 159 (fitness) produced by the individual i,w is the mean number of offspring produced, ∆z i 160 represents the difference between the average z value among the individual i's offspring 161 and i's own z value, Cov i (·) and E i (·) denote the expectation and covariance over all 162 individuals i in the population respectively.
163
By introducing the genetic mixing in the simulations, individuals in the population 164 have been assigned into small groups. We are able to further partition that selection 165 based on cooperative investment to account for individuals that are nested within 166 collectives. Specifically, we can expand Eq. (S11) by substituting its right hand side of 167 the equation into the expectation term. Note that the groups that form each 168 subpopulation g are the individuals ig. We can re-write the two-level Price equation as 169 follows:
wherew g = E(w ig ) andz g = E(z ig ). The first covariance term on the right hand side of 171 the equation indicates the selection on cooperative investment at level of subpopulations 172 (between-group selection), whereas the second expectation term captures the selection 173 at individual level (within-group selection). Table S1 . Evolved traits against genetic relatedness. We evolved 5, 000 initially identical genotypes for 5, 000 generations with no auto-regulation (A) and auto-regulation (B), respectively. In all simulations, the cost of cooperation and the cost of signaling were fixed. Each dot represents the evolved mean results (averaged over the last 50 generations) for different average number of genotypes per groupḠ (λ G ∈ [0, 10]; step size: 0.1). The remaining parameters used in the simulations can be found in Table S1 . Overall cooperation payoff for fixed trait evolution. We used a fixed signal production rate of 0.5 × 10 −8 and a fixed response threshold of 3 µM for QS-controlled cooperation without auto-regulation, respectively. The cost of cooperation and cost of signaling were also set to be the same as in (A). In all cases, we evolved 5, 000 initially identical genotypes for 5, 000 generations. Each dot represents the evolved mean results (averaged over the last 50 generations) for different average number of genotypes per groupḠ (λ G ∈ [0, 10]; step size: 0.1). The vertical error bars represent the standard deviation of overall cooperation payoff over 30 replications. The remaining parameters used in the simulations can be found in Table S1 . Auto-regulation Ratio Fig S5. Evolved auto-regulation ratio against genetic relatedness. We evolved 5, 000 initially identical genotypes for 5, 000 generations with auto-regulation. In the simulations, the cost of cooperation and the cost of signaling were fixed. Each dot represents the evolved mean results (averaged over the last 50 generations) of auto-regulation ratio (r as in Eq. (S6)) for different average number of genotypes per groupḠ (λ G ∈ [0, 10]; step size: 0.1). The vertical error bars represent the standard deviation over 30 replications. The remaining parameters used in the simulations can be found in Table S1 . Table S1 . Comparison of frequency of cheats for the evolved system with or without auto-regulation. We evolved 5, 000 initially identical genotypes for 5, 000 generations with no auto-regulation (A) and auto-regulation (B), respectively. In all simulations, the cost of cooperation and the cost of signaling were fixed. A certain number of individuals (drawn from a Poisson distribution with λ Cheat = 0.1) chosen at random were replaced with the constitutive cheats in every generation. Each round dot (no auto-regulation) or square dot (auto-regulation) represents the evolved mean results (averaged over the last 50 generations) for different average number of genotypes per groupḠ (λ G ∈ [0, 10]; step size: 0.1). The vertical error bars represent the standard deviation over 30 replications. The remaining parameters used in the simulations can be found in Table S1 . . For fixed costs of cooperation and signaling with the number of mixing genotypes G = 5, we collected 5, 000 same initial genotypes and evolved them for 5, 000 generations with no auto-regulation (A) and auto-regulation (B). We recorded the individual and group mean investment for cooperation at the last generation over 100 replications. Each blue dot represents an individual's investment against its group mean investment. The red lines are the regression lines fitted using the generalized linear model with a normal distribution. The analysis of covariance shows there is a significant difference between the slope of no auto-regulation in (A) and the slope of auto-regulation in (B) (F -test, p = 0.000). The remaining parameters used in the simulations can be found in Table S1 . Selection on cooperative investment within and between groups (G = 2). We evolved 5, 000 initially identical genotypes for 5, 000 generations with no auto-regulation (A) and auto-regulation (B), respectively. In all simulations, the cost of cooperation and the cost of signaling were fixed, and the number of mixing genotypes was fixed G = 2. We recorded the two-level Price equation components in every generation. The reported results were the average value over 100 replications. The remaining parameters used in the simulations can be found in Table S1 . Selection on cooperative investment within and between groups (G = 5). We evolved 5, 000 initially identical genotypes for 5, 000 generations with no auto-regulation (A) and auto-regulation (B), respectively. In all simulations, the cost of cooperation and the cost of signaling were fixed, and the number of mixing genotypes was fixed G = 5. We recorded the two-level Price equation components in every generation. The reported results were the average value over 100 replications. The remaining parameters used in the simulations can be found in Table S1 .
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